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Did the U.S. government’s intervention in the Chrysler 
reorganization overturn bankruptcy law? Critics 
argue that the government-sponsored reorganization 
impermissibly elevated claims of the auto union over 
those of Chrysler’s other creditors. If the critics are 
correct, businesses might suffer an increase in their cost 
of debt because creditors will perceive a new risk, that 
organized labor might leap-frog them in bankruptcy. This 
paper examines the financial market where this effect 
would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly 
unionized companies. The authors find no evidence of a 
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negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by bondholders 
of unionized firms. They thus reject the notion that 
investors perceived a distortion of bankruptcy priorities. 
To the contrary, bondholders of unionized firms reacted 
positively to the Chrysler bailout. This evidence suggests 
that bondholders interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a 
signal that the government will stand behind unionized 
firms. The results are consistent with the notion that too-
big-to-fail government policies generate moral hazard in 
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I.   Introduction 
 
  In late 2008 and early 2009, the outgoing Bush and incoming Obama 
administrations announced a series of steps to assist Chrysler, the struggling automaker, 
in an extraordinary intervention into private industry.  Some charge that the government, 
in implementing the bailout, impermissibly favored the auto union over Chrysler’s 
secured bondholders.  As these critics see it, the government attempted to save the 
politically powerful union by elevating the unsecured claims of organized labor above the 
secured claims of the bondholders, contrary to well-established creditor priorities in 
bankruptcy.  If the critics are correct, the Chrysler bailout could represent an overturning 
of bankruptcy law in the U.S.   
A long-standing principal of bankruptcy law requires that a debtor’s secured 
creditors be repaid, in full, before its unsecured creditors receive anything.  However, 
critics argue that the government structured Chrysler’s bankruptcy reorganization so that 
Chrysler’s unsecured creditor, the auto union, got paid before Chrysler’s secured 
creditors were fully repaid.  The auto union walked away from the reorganization with 
$1.5 billion in cash, a $4.6 billion note, and a majority equity stake in the reorganized 
Chrysler, despite the fact that Chrysler’s bondholders, who were secured creditors, had 
not been repaid in full.  Although they had a $6.9 billion secured claim on Chrysler, the 
bondholders received only $2 billion in the reorganization, or twenty-nine cents on the 
dollar.   
As critics view the Chrysler reorganization, the bankruptcy laws established by 
Congress were arbitrarily overthrown by an act of the Executive, undermining long-
established tenants of debt financing.  They believe that, in protecting the interests of 
taxpayers, the Treasury negotiated aggressively with the secured creditors but, in 
protecting the interests of organized labor, the Treasury offered the union special 
treatment.
1  Hence, the critics attack the Chrysler reorganization as a government transfer 
                                                 
1 The Treasury negotiated aggressively in the reorganizations, extracting significant concessions.  Some felt 
that “the government was too tough, or too tough with the wrong parties.” CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE 
DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 111 (2009) [hereinafter “PANEL REPORT”].  The negotiations reportedly 
gave rise to “allegations of threats and bullying.” PANEL REPORT, supra, at n.506 (noting that the panel’s 3 
 
of value from one group to another based on political considerations in place of 
established law.  As one participant interpreted the transaction, the assets of retired 
Indiana policemen (which were invested in Chrysler’s secured debt) were given to retired 
Michigan autoworkers.
2  Critics wonder “why the UAW funds should be favored over 
other retirement funds, those that invested in Chrysler secured debt.”
3  Chrysler’s 
bondholders argued that the “government is penalizing people … for having funded 
[their] retirement with … bonds” and that they were “being ignored in negotiations and 
singled out to bear the greatest share of the cost of restructuring.”
4  Others believed that 
“everything this Treasury touches turns to politics.”
5  The Chrysler bondholders argued 
that the deal is “overturning the rule of law and practices that have governed our … 
bankruptcy code for decades.”
6  Critics assert that this disregard of creditors’ rights 
represents a precedent-setting distortion of bankruptcy priorities, opening the door to 
future distributions of assets to favorite political groups.   
  Critics warn that the Chrysler reorganization will have severe consequences in 
financial markets, disrupting credit markets and increasing the cost of debt for borrowers.   
Financial experts such as Warren Buffett have stated that the federal government’s 
actions in the bankruptcy can have “a whole lot of consequences” for deal making.
7  
According to Buffett, the government’s treatment of Chrysler’s secured creditors is 
“going to disrupt lending practices in the future. If we want to encourage lending in this 
country, we don’t want to say to somebody who lends and gets a secured position that the 
secured position doesn’t mean anything.”
8  Buffett’s concerns echo those of many debt 
market participants, who fear that “lenders may be unwilling to back unionized 
                                                                                                                                                 
staff contacted many of the parties involved in the transactions to substantiate the allegations, but none of 
the inquiries received a response). 
2 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 52. 
3 Adler (2009) at 6. 
4 Dennis Buckholtz, Op-Ed., GM Bondholders Are People Like You and Me, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2009, at 
A17; see also Statement from Non-TARP Lenders of Chrysler, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2009.   
5 Gettelfinger Motors, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2009, at A14.   
6 Statement from Non-TARP Lenders of Chrysler, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2009.   
7 Lou Whiteman, Buffett Warns of Chrysler Cramdown Ramifications, THEDEAL.COM, May 5, 2009, 
available at http://thedeal.com/dealscape/2009/05/buffett_warns_of_chrysler_cram.php. 
8 Id. 4 
 
companies.”
9  Those participants believe “lenders will have to figure out how to price this 
risk …. [Either] don’t lend money to a company with big legacy liabilities, or demand a 
much higher rate of interest because you may be leap-frogged in a bankruptcy.”
10  A 
Congressional panel hypothesized that “Treasury’s involvement in the Chrysler 
bankruptcy … is likely to cause investors to reevaluate their risk assessment regarding 
certain companies with similar characteristics.”
11  In other words, if a government bailout 
distorts creditor priorities, lenders may think twice before making secured loans to firms 
that might receive a government bailout, due to the risk that junior creditors might leap-
frog them when the company experiences financial distress.   
  Critics distinguish public bailouts from other reorganizations because dealing 
with the U.S. government is not the same as dealing with private DIP lenders.  The 
Treasury can exert greater influence over the parties than a private lender can.  One 
reason is that “the government [can] accuse a bondholder … of failing to assume some 
correct proportion of ‘shared sacrifice.’”
12  For example, President Obama referred to 
Chrysler’s dissident bondholders as “speculators” who were “refusing to sacrifice like 
everyone else.”
13  The U.S. government “has a throw weight that its counterparties cannot 
match, as there is little in the regular commercial arsenal that can counter a charge of 
‘unpatriotic’ behavior by the President of the United States.”
14   
  Moreover, some critics fear that the Chrysler bailout is not an isolated, one-time 
event.  Further government interventions using TARP funds have been suggested.   For 
example, a Congressional panel, in its report on the use of TARP funds to support the 
auto industry, asked Treasury to “provide its legal analysis justifying the use of TARP 
funds for this purpose. This analysis will inform policymakers’ and taxpayers’ 
understanding of the potential for Treasury to use its authority to assist other struggling 
                                                 
9 Caroline Salas, Fund Managers Burned by Obama Now Say They Are Wary, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5u0MEwLik7A (May 20, 2009, 18:13 
EDT). 
10 Id.  
11 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 53. 
12 Id. at n.506. 
13 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on the Auto Industry 
(April 30, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-
the-Auto-Industry. 
14 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at n.506. 5 
 
industries.”
15  The panel’s report even lays out criteria for further Treasury interventions 
(in Section D).  Hence, critics say the Chrysler bailout demonstrates the federal 
government’s inclination to intervene in private industry when politically motivated.   
Some market players assert that, with “anything that involves a large number of jobs or 
affects a large number of people, you can expect to see a Chrysler redux.”
16  Because of 
such possibilities, companies that are public bailout candidates may face higher 
borrowing costs than companies not at risk of government intervention.   
Notwithstanding the criticisms, the Chrysler bailout does have its supporters.   
Supporters argue that the public assistance to Chrysler was a reluctant intervention by a 
lender of last resort acting through a clever but legal manipulation of the bankruptcy 
system.  Supporters add that, in any event, the decision to assist Chrysler is an isolated 
policy choice that should have no ramifications beyond the auto industry.  Others point 
out that priority violations in bankruptcy have become commonplace, especially with the 
development of the claims trading markets in recent decades, and should cause no alarm. 
In other words, the Chrysler bailout has generated an important debate among 
market participants and academics in bankruptcy and finance.  Did the government 
intervene in Chrysler in a manner that overturns bankruptcy law in the U.S.?  This study 
answers that question by performing an empirical analysis of the bailout’s impact on 
credit markets.   
The same question was raised by Congress when it established an oversight panel in 
connection with TARP to review “the impact of Treasury decisions on the financial 
markets.”  The panel sought to examine “whether predictions that the Chrysler decision 
would result in changes in market behavior or the cost of capital were (1) accurate and (2) 
measurable.”
17  In its report to Congress, the panel concluded that “there is little 
evidence, empirical or anecdotal,” to answer the question.  The panel believed that it is 
“too early and, given the number of variables, perhaps not possible to conclude one way 
or another as to what effect the government’s involvement in the Chrysler bankruptcy 
will have on the credit markets.”
18  We, however, disagree with the panel’s conclusion.  
                                                 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 Salas, supra note 9. 
17 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 53. 
18 Id. 6 
 
This study performs the crucial empirical analysis of the government’s bailout of 
Chrysler that the oversight panel did not attempt.   
  We answer the question empirically by examining the financial market where the 
effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies.  If 
the government, in order to favor organized labor, implemented the Chrysler 
reorganization in a manner that ignored established lending priorities, investors in other 
unionized companies should have perceived increased risk. Rational investors would 
price this increased risk into the debt of the unionized firms.  We test this claim 
empirically and find no evidence of a negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by the 
bondholders of unionized firms.  We thus reject the notion that investors perceived a 
distortion of bankruptcy priorities in the Chrysler case. 
  To the contrary, we find that bondholders of unionized firms reacted positively to 
the Chrysler bailout. During the period when the Chrysler bailout was being formulated, 
adopted, and implemented, bonds of unionized firms generated lower yields (i.e., traded 
at higher prices in the bond markets) than bonds of non-unionized companies.  Unionized 
firms also generated greater returns over the period for their bondholders than non-
unionized firms generated for their bondholders.  That is, it appears that bondholders 
interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a signal that the government will stand behind the 
obligations of unionized firms.  In other words, the Chrysler bailout created a perception 
that unionized companies will receive preferential treatment from the government.  This 
result suggests that the bailout generated moral hazard in the credit markets.  Although 
the result is not dispositive of the issue, the paper provides empirical support for a link 
between “too-big-to-fail” government policies and moral hazard in the financial markets.    
The next section describes the federal government’s bailout of Chrysler.  Section 
III presents the hypotheses to be tested.  Section IV identifies the related literature.   
Section V describes the data and the methodologies employed.  The empirical results are 
presented in Section VI.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II.   The Reorganization of Chrysler 
 
  In December, 2008, Chrysler (along with General Motors) was on the brink of 
insolvency.  The automaker could not obtain the financing needed to conduct day-to-day 7 
 
operations.  Chrysler, which employed over 55,000 workers, turned to the U.S. 
government for help.  Congress considered legislation that would rescue the automaker, 
but the legislation failed to pass.  President Bush thereupon ordered the United States 
Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) to extend a $4 billion loan to Chrysler.  To 
make the loan, the Treasury tapped funds in the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”) enacted by Congress through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 (“EESA”)
19 as a way to keep distressed financial institutions from collapsing.   
  The $4 billion loan was only a bridge loan, however, intended to buy Chrysler a 
few extra months of breathing room until the incoming Obama administration entered 
office.  The loan required that Chrysler submit to the Obama administration a turn-around 
plan showing Chrysler’s proposed path to becoming a viable, independent entity.   On 
February 17, 2009, Chrysler submitted its proposed plan to the Obama administration.  
Notably, Chrysler’s plan contemplated the eventual full repayment of its outstanding 
senior secured debt.
20   
  On March 30, 2009, the Treasury rejected Chrysler’s plan, and gave Chrysler 
thirty days to propose another arrangement that would eliminate the company’s senior 
secured debt through the use of the bankruptcy code.
21  More particularly, the Treasury 
announced that Chrysler’s revised plan would have to show that Chrysler will take 
several steps: (i) enter into a partnership with Fiat to bring new management and 
technology to Chrysler; (ii) enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with the 
United Auto Workers union (the “UAW”); and (iii) restructure its balance sheet so that it 
has a sustainable debt burden.  The Treasury contemplated that this third step would 
“require extinguishing the vast majority of Chrysler’s outstanding secured debt and all of 
its unsecured debt and equity.”
22  The Treasury stated that the “most effective way for 
Chrysler to emerge from this restructuring [would be to use] an expedited bankruptcy 
process as a tool to extinguish liabilities.”
23  Treasury told Chrysler's creditors that, 
instead of reorganizing under a Chapter 11 plan, Chrysler must opt for a “quick and 
                                                 
19 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5241. 
20 Chrysler Restructuring Plan for Long-Term Viability (February 17, 2009). 
21 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec‘y, Fact Sheet: Obama Administration New Path to 
Viability for GM & Chrysler (Mar. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Fact_Sheet_GM_Chrysler_FIN.pdf.   
22 Id.   
23 Id.   8 
 
surgical” reorganization.  The Treasury envisioned that Chrysler would sell its assets 
“free and clear” of all interests, under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, to a newly 
created shell corporation that would become the revitalized “Chrysler.”
24   Only if these 
conditions were satisfied would the Treasury provide the billions of dollars of additional 
TARP loans required to finance Chrysler's ongoing operations.   Since the TARP-funded 
loans were the only apparent source of available cash, most of Chrysler’s creditors 
acquiesced to the proposed restructuring plan.  A timeline of events is set forth in the 
Appendix hereto. 
  Here’s how the restructuring worked.  Chrysler and its subsidiaries (referred to 
herein as “Old Chrysler”) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on April 30, 2009.
25  Instead of then exiting Chapter 11 through a plan 
of reorganization confirmed by the creditors, the company left bankruptcy through the 
“side door” of section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 363 allows a debtor to sell 
assets to a buyer free and clear of creditor claims.  Only weeks after filing for Chapter 11, 
the majority of Old Chrysler’s assets were sold to a newly-formed entity (referred to 
herein as “New Chrysler”) under section 363 of the Code.
26  New Chrysler agreed to 
assume some of the liabilities of Old Chrysler, most notably the unsecured obligations 
owed to UAW retirees.  But most liabilities remained with Old Chrysler, including the 
secured liabilities owed to Old Chrysler’s lenders.  Through this mechanism, critics 
argue, the claims of unsecured creditors (the UAW retirees) were elevated above the 
claims secured creditors, contrary to established priorities in bankruptcy.  
  To see this, consider the following.  Upon filing Chapter 11, Old Chrysler was 
indebted to several groups of creditors.  First, Old Chrysler owed $6.9 billion to a 
syndicate of lenders, secured by a first-priority security interest in substantially all of Old 
Chrysler’s assets.
27  Second, Old Chrysler owed $2 billion to Cerberus and Daimer, Old 
Chrysler’s equity holders, secured by a second-priority security interest in Old Chrysler’s 
                                                 
24 Pet.App. 120a-125a. 
25 See Voluntary Petition, In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50002).    
26 See In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d 
Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009) 
(mem.). 
27 Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 89. 9 
 
assets.
28  Third, Old Chrysler owed over $4 billion to the U.S. Treasury pursuant to 
TARP (and to the Canadian government), secured by a third-priority security interest in 
Old Chrysler’s assets.
29  Fourth, Old Chrysler owed $10 billion, on an unsecured basis, to 
a trust established to provide healthcare benefits to union retirees (the “UAW Trust”), a 
voluntary employee benefit association.
30  Unlike the other debt, the obligation to the 
UAW Trust was not secured.  As an unsecured creditor, the UAW Trust was entitled to 
repayment only after Old Chrysler’s secured creditors has been repaid in full.  Finally, 
Old Chrysler owed approximately $5 billion to various trade creditors, as well as billions 
in warranty and dealer obligations.
31  This indebtedness was also unsecured.  Finally, Old 
Chrysler owed about $5 billion in debtor-in-possession financing to the U.S. Treasury 
and the Canadian government to fund Chrysler’s bankruptcy.
32   
 The crucial features of the Chrysler reorganization are illustrated in Figure 1.  
With the approval of the bankruptcy court, Old Chrysler sold substantially all its 
operating assets to New Chrysler, a newly-formed entity, in exchange for $2 billion in 
cash from New Chrysler and the assumption of some of Old Chrysler’s liabilities (most 
notably, the obligations owed to the UAW Trust).  The $2 billion received by Old 
Chrysler was distributed to Old Chrysler’s first-priority secured lenders, in accordance 
                                                 
28 Id.  Chrysler’s equity was owned by Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. and its affiliates (80%) and by 
Daimler AG and its affiliates (20%).  Id.   
29 Id. at 89-90.  The government’s security interest had third priority in the assets encumbered by the first- 
and second-priority security interests, and a first-priority security interest in any remaining unencumbered 
assets. 
30 Application for Immediate Stay of Sale Orders Issued by the Bankruptcy Court at 6, Ind. State Police 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275 (2009) (No. 08A1096). 
Chrysler’s $10 billion commitment to the UAW Trust arose out of a litigation settlement reached in 2008 
with the International Union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America (the “UAW”). Pursuant to the settlement, Chrysler was obligated to fund the UAW Trust with 
cash.  According to the Panel Report, 
By the end of the last century, Ford, Chrysler and GM found themselves faced with tens of 
billions of dollars in employee health obligations. In 2007 and 2008, after it became clear to 
both the companies and their unions that the state of the American automotive industry 
made these healthcare obligations unsustainable, the UAW and each of the three companies 
ultimately entered into an agreement whereby, in exchange for significant upfront payments 
principally in the form of cash and notes, healthcare obligations for retired union employees 
would be transferred off the books of the companies and into a trust (an independent entity 
totally separate from either the union or the automotive companies), the UAW Retiree 
Medical Benefits Trust, a Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association.   PANEL REPORT, 
supra note 1, at n.49. 
31 Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 89. 
32 Id. at 92.  With a priming lien, the debtor-in-possession lenders would have been entitled to repayment 
ahead of the first-priority secured lenders.  However, the debtor-in-possession lenders were the U.S. 
Treasury and Canada, the sponsors of the restructuring. 10 
 
with bankruptcy’s priority rule.  Since the first-priority secured lenders were owed $6.9 
billion, they received 29 cents on the dollar, leaving no assets for junior secured lenders 
or for unsecured creditors.  Old Chrysler’s equity holders also received nothing.    
How did New Chrysler, a newly formed entity, obtain the cash to purchase Old 
Chrysler’s assets? The U.S. Treasury agreed to provide New Chrysler up to $6 billion in 
senior secured loans to fund the asset purchase, as well as its ongoing operations.
33  The 
Canadian government, in addition, committed to provide financing to New Chrysler’s 
Canadian affiliate.  In return, New Chrysler issued an 8% equity stake to the U.S. 
Treasury and a 2% equity stake to the Canadian government.
34  Up to 35% of the equity 
in New Chrysler was awarded to Fiat S.p.A. (“Fiat”) in return for its provision of 
technology, distribution systems, and other capabilities to New Chrysler.
35  As part of a 
collective bargaining agreement with the UAW, New Chrysler granted a 55% equity 
stake to the UAW Trust, paid $1.5 billion in cash to the UAW Trust, and issued a $4.6 
billion unsecured note to the UAW Trust.
36   
It was an important step for New Chrysler to reach the collective bargaining 
agreement with the UAW.  Covering both active and retired workers, the agreement 
provides New Chrysler with Old Chrysler’s labor force but at a reduced wage structure 
for active employees and a reduced funding structure for retirees, bringing them more 
into line with those of foreign auto manufacturers in the U.S.
37  Such an agreement was 
obtainable, in part, because the UAW wanted to ensure continued employment for its 
active employees as well as continued funding of the UAW Trust for retirees.  UAW 
retirees have to look exclusively to that UAW Trust for healthcare benefits, and Old 
Chrysler’s obligation to continue funding the UAW Trust is solely a contractual (i.e., 
voidable) one, not subject to ERISA funding rules.
38  The bankruptcy, consequently, 
                                                 
33 Id.    
34 New Chrysler also assumed $500 million of TARP financing owed by Old Chrysler to the U.S. Treasury 
and $600 million owed by Old Chrysler to the Canadian government.   
35 Fiat has an initial 20% stake, which increases to up to 35% upon achievement of certain performance 
metrics.  The equity percentages presented above assume Fiat achieves those performance metrics.   
Initially, 9.85% of the equity in New Chrysler was held by the U.S. Treasury, 2.46% by the Canadian 
government, 67.69% by the UAW Trust, and 20% by Fiat.  Id. at 92. 
36 Id.    
37 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
38 The UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust is a Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA). 
VEBAs are tax free entities that pay health, life, or similar benefits. Although subject to the fiduciary 11 
 
jeopardized the funding commitments that Chrysler had made to the UAW Trust.  In 
place of its $10 billion unsecured claim on Old Chrysler, the UAW Trust agreed to take a 
$4.6 billion unsecured note from New Chrysler, as well as $1.5 billion in upfront cash 
and a 55% equity stake in New Chrysler.
39  As a result, New Chrysler’s commitment to 
fund retiree healthcare benefits is not as burdensome as the one that weighted down its 
predecessor, while the UAW Trust walks away from the reorganization with a greater 
payout than it would have received had it remained solely an unsecured creditor of Old 
Chrysler.  
During the bankruptcy proceedings, three Indiana state pension funds objected to Old 
Chrysler’s sale of its assets to New Chrysler and the release of their liens.
40  The Indiana 
pension funds were among the first-priority secured lenders of Old Chrysler.
41  The dissident 
pension funds argued that the sale would improperly result in value going to the unsecured 
creditors before the secured creditors had been paid in full.
42  Specifically, the pension funds 
pointed out that, according to the terms of the sale documents, an unsecured creditor of Old 
Chrysler, the UAW Trust, would receive payments (consisting of $1.5 billion in cash from 
New Chrysler, a 55% equity stake in New Chrysler, and a $4.6 billion note issued by New 
Chrysler) before Old Chrysler’s secured creditors had been paid in full.
43  The Indiana 
pension funds and the other first-priority secured lenders, receiving $2 billion from the sale 
on their $6.9 billion claim, would be receiving only twenty-nine cents on the dollar, while the 
UAW Trust, an unsecured lender, would be receiving payments worth billions of dollars.
44  
The Indiana pension funds argued that the sale would violate creditor priorities, making it an 
illicit sub rosa confirmation plan.
45   
                                                                                                                                                 
requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), they are not subject to 
ERISA funding rules as are qualified retirement plans.  Instead, a company’s obligation to fund the trust is 
solely contractual.  PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at n.49. 
39 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec‘y, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring 
Initiative (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Obama-
Administration-Auto-Restructuring-Initiative. 
40 Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 93.  The funds consist of two pension funds that are fiduciaries for retirement 
assets of Indiana police officers and school teachers, and an infrastructure construction fund.  Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 4, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009) (No. 09-
285), 2009 WL 2864378.  The three funds together held about $43 million of first-priority secured debt of 
Chrysler. Id.  There was more opposition earlier in the restructuring.  At one point, 30 funds holding over 
$1 billion objected to Obama’s plan.  Salas, supra note 9. 
41 Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 93. 
42 Id. at 93. 
43 Id. at 92.  
44 Id. at 93. 
45 Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 95-96. 12 
 
The bankruptcy court, however, disagreed.  Key to the court’s conclusion was its view 
that the UAW Trust would not be receiving any payments on account of its pre-petition 
claims on Old Chrysler.
46  Instead, according to the court, the payments to the UAW Trust 
resulted from independent, arms-length negotiations between the UAW and the buyer (New 
Chrysler), resulting in the UAW Trust providing new value to New Chrysler.  The 
bankruptcy court stated: 
[I]n negotiating with those groups essential to is viability, New Chrysler made certain 
agreements and provided ownership interests in the new entity, which was neither a diversion 
of value from the Debtors’ assets nor an allocation of the proceeds from the sale of the 
Debtors’ assets. The allocation of ownership interests in the new enterprise is irrelevant to the 
estates’ economic interests.
47 
The bankruptcy court viewed the payments to the UAW Trust as “provided under separately-
negotiated agreements with New Chrysler” and not on account of their pre-petition claims on 
Old Chrysler.
48   
The Indiana state pension funds immediately appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling.  
The Second Circuit issued a short order ratifying the bankruptcy court’s decision and issuing 
a stay to allow for the U.S. Supreme Court’s review.  The Supreme Court, however, denied a 
request for a stay of the bankruptcy reorganization.
49  Upon remand, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.
50  The Second Circuit decided that all consideration 
paid to the UAW Trust by New Chrysler was in exchange for new value given, not in 
exchange for the UAW Trust’s claim on the debtor’s estate.
51  Hence, the court concluded 
that the transaction was consistent with bankruptcy priority rules and that the asset sale did 
not constitute a sub rosa confirmation plan.
52 
 
III.   Hypotheses  
 
                                                 
46 Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (2009) (per curiam). 
50 In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler II), 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009) (mem.).  On September 3, 2009, the Indiana pension 
funds filed a petition for writ of certiorari  to the U.S. Supreme Court to appeal the Second Circuit’s 
decision.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40.  The pension funds no longer sought to block the 
asset sale as before, but rather sought a greater repayment on the loan.  Id. at 16-42. The Supreme Court, 
however, vacated the Second Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case to the Second Circuit with instructions 
to dismiss the appeal as moot.  Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009) 
(mem.). 
51 Chrysler II at 118. 
52 Id. at 118 n.9. 13 
 
The Chrysler bailout was interpreted not only by the courts, but also by the credit 
markets.  Did market participants believe the Chrysler bailout jeopardized lending 
priorities?  The question may be answered empirically by examining the market where an 
effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies.  
Depending on how market participants viewed the government’s intervention in the 
Chrysler reorganization, the transaction could have produced a positive, a negative, or an 
insignificant impact on bond prices of unionized companies.    
 
H1: The federal government’s intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy 
overturned creditor priorities under bankruptcy law, generating a 
fundamental change in how reorganizations will be conducted.   
 
The first hypothesis is that the bond market interpreted the Chrysler bailout as an 
alteration of the long-standing absolute priority rule of bankruptcy.  The absolute priority 
rule provides that claimants be paid in order of seniority, with secured creditors ranking 
ahead of unsecured creditors, who rank ahead of equity holders.  A secured creditor, 
which lends to a debtor against collateral, expects to have a lower risk of non-payment 
than were it an unsecured creditor, and prices the loan accordingly.  As a result, 
violations of established creditor priorities might have substantial ramifications for the 
availability and cost of credit. 
If the market viewed the Chrysler bailout as a violation of creditor priorities, the 
bailout should have had a negative impact on bond prices of unionized companies.   
According to this hypothesis, investors in unionized companies should have demanded a 
higher return on their capital in response to the Chrysler bailout, to compensate for the 
increased risk that junior creditors (organized labor) might leap-frog them when the 
company experiences financial distress.  In other words, bond prices of unionized 
companies should have significantly decreased following the Chrysler bailout.  Stated 
equivalently, yields on bonds of unionized companies should have significantly 
increased.   
Critics of the Chrysler reorganization argue that the transaction establishes a 
dangerous precedent by validating a deal structure that disregards creditor priorities in 14 
 
bankruptcy.
53  The Bankruptcy Code requires that creditors receive “fair and equitable” 
treatment.
54  Fair and equitable treatment requires in part that a junior-priority class of 
claims may not receive assets from the debtor while a more senior class of claims has not 
been paid in full and objects to the payment.
55  In Chrysler, certain secured creditors 
objected to the asset sale because they would only receive twenty-nine cents on the dollar 
while the UAW Trust, with a lower priority claim, would receive billions of dollars.
56   
These secured creditors also attempted to invoke the rule against “unfair 
discrimination.”
57  The rule against unfair discrimination requires that similarly ranked 
creditors be paid pro rata.
58  Since the value of the secured creditors’ claims exceeded the 
value of Chrysler’s collateral, the secured creditors were deemed to be in part secured 
creditors (to the extent of the value of the collateral) and in part unsecured creditors (to 
the extent of their deficiency claim, the amount by which their secured claims exceed the 
value of the collateral).
59  Hence, with respect to their deficiency claim, the secured 
creditors were unsecured, ranking in priority equal to the UAW Trust and other 
unsecured creditors.
60  Yet the asset sale resulted in cash and securities being paid to the 
unsecured UAW Trust, while nothing was paid to the secured creditors on their 
deficiency claim.
61  The secured creditors argued that this result constitutes unfair 
discrimination.
62  These arguments were ultimately rejected in court. 
  As critics view the Chrysler reorganization, the bankruptcy law established by 
Congress were arbitrarily overthrown by an act of the Executive, undermining long-
established tenants of debt financing.  The purported disregard of creditors’ rights in the 
Chrysler bailout would establish a precedent for future distributions of assets to favorite 
political groups.   
                                                 
53 See Warburton (2010) for a more detailed delineation of arguments against the Chrysler reorganization.  
See also Roe and Skeel (2010), Adler (2009), and Todd J. Zywicki, Opinion, Chrysler and the Rule of Law, 
Wall St. J. (May 13, 2009). 
54 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006).   
55 Id. § 1129(b)(2).  Known as the absolute priority rule, it, along with the requirement that no creditor be 
paid more than it is owed, constitute the fair and equitable rule.  7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[4] 
(Allan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009).  
56 Chrysler II, 576 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2009). 
57 Brief for Appellants Indiana State Pension Trust et al. at 24, Chrysler II, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(No. 09-2311-bk), 2009 WL 1560029; Chrysler II, 576 F.3d at 112-13.    
58 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55,  ¶ 1129.03[3]. 
59 Brief for Appellants Indiana State Pension Trust, supra note 57, at 24; Chrysler II, 576 F.3d at 123. 
60 Brief for Appellants Indiana State Pension Trust, supra note 57, at 24; Chrysler II, 576 F.3d at 123. 
61 Brief for Appellants Indiana State Pension Trust, supra note 57, at 24; Chrysler II, 576 F.3d at 123. 
62 Brief for Appellants Indiana State Pension Trust, supra note 57, at 24; Chrysler II, 576 F.3d at 123. 15 
 
   Critics add that the Chrysler bailout is not an isolated, one-time event, as further 
government interventions using TARP funds have been suggested.   Hence, lenders might 
believe the Chrysler bailout demonstrates the federal government’s inclination to 
intervene in private industry when politically motivated.  As a result, lenders would be 
reluctant to make secured loans to firms that might receive a government bailout, or 
would demand a higher rate of interest, due to the risk that junior creditors might leap-
frog them when the company experiences financial distress.  If the bond market believes 
such possibilities are real, companies that are public bailout candidates should face higher 
borrowing costs than companies not at risk of government intervention.   
 
H2: The federal government’s involvement in the Chrysler bankruptcy 
occurred in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, and no statutory 
priorities were overturned.  
 
The second hypothesis is that the credit market believed the government was 
acting as an arm’s-length participant in a section 363 asset sale, which has become an 
increasingly common means to exit bankruptcy.
63  Proponents of the bailout argue that, 
although TARP money was used to fund the reorganization, the Treasury was nothing 
more than a debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender in an otherwise typical bankruptcy 
reorganization.
64  Although the involvement of the Treasury in place of a private lender 
may have been novel, the use of DIP financing and an asset sale to effect a reorganization 
was not.  Hence, from this viewpoint, the transaction left unaltered established 
bankruptcy practices and priorities.  Therefore, prices of bonds of unionized companies 
(and their yields) should not exhibit any significant change around the Chrysler bailout. 
Proponents of the reorganization assert that no payments were made to the UAW 
Trust on account of the Trust’s pre-petition claims on Old Chrysler.  Instead, they argue 
that the payments to the UAW Trust were extracted from New Chrysler, the newly-
constituted entity, as the product of a fresh negotiation between the Trust and New 
Chrysler.
65  While the proceeds that the debtor receives in an asset sale must be 
                                                 
63 See Stephen J. Lubben, Appendix to Testimony Before Oversight Panel, (July 27, 2009). 
64 See Warburton (2010) for a more detailed delineation of the arguments in defense of the Chrysler 
reorganization.  See also Morrison (2009) and Lubben (2009). 
65 Critics respond that the asset sale by Old Chrysler did more than merely sell assets for cash.  The sale 
effectively determined which creditors of the Old Chrysler would get paid, and how much they would be 16 
 
distributed to its creditors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rule, the 
purchaser of assets is not restrained by the Code in its use of those assets, the price it pays 
to acquire them, or any other manner.
66  Proponents observe that the purchaser is free to 
strike any deal it can with its own financers, suppliers, labor unions, and other 
stakeholders.  If these stakeholders establish relationships with the purchaser on more 
favorable terms than “those whose relationships terminated with the bankruptcy estate, 
this perceived disparity has a clear business reason; i.e., the purchaser needs to maintain 
these relationships to make its business viable.”
67   
For instance, if the purchaser needs to continue ordering from the debtor’s 
suppliers, then those suppliers may be paid by the purchaser even though the suppliers 
are entitled to nothing from the debtor under Chapter 11.  The two transactions are 
independent; there is no “exchange” of claims against the debtor for payments from the 
purchaser.  This is the case so long as payments from the purchaser are made in exchange 
for the provision of goods or services to the purchaser.  According to supporters of the 
Chrysler asset sale, the assets were purchased cleanly and appropriately from Old 
Chrysler by New Chrysler for $2 billion.  New Chrysler then, in separate transactions, 
entered into independent agreements with financers, suppliers, labor, and other 
stakeholders, some of which happen to involve Old Chrysler’s creditors.   
Proponents argue that New Chrysler had to negotiate with various constituencies 
“essential to the new venture, including . . . Chrysler’s employees – contributing a skilled 
workforce with a more competitive cost structure.”
68  Since New Chrysler needed skilled 
workers (and labor peace), proponents believe the UAW had bargaining leverage with 
New Chrysler, which enabled it to extract continued support for retiree health plans and 
an ownership stake in New Chrysler.  The secured creditors of Old Chrysler lacked 
similar bargaining power with New Chrysler.  Parties with whom New Chrysler must do 
business going forward (such as the UAW) have leverage in negotiating favorable terms, 
                                                                                                                                                 
paid. Adler (2009) at 3; Roe and Skeel (2010) at 5 and 22.  The sale terms fully determined the distribution 
amount that Old Chrysler’s secured creditors would receive from the debtor: the first-priority secured 
parties’ distribution equaled the $2 billion sales proceeds.  Moreover, the sale terms provided Old 
Chrysler’s unsecured creditor, the UAW Trust, with $1.5 billion in cash, a promise of an additional $4.6 
billion, and substantial equity in New Chrysler.  The terms of the 363 sale, hence, fully determined the 
payments made to Old Chrysler’s creditors.   
66 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 48. 
67 Id. 
68 Chrysler I, 405 B.R. 84, 99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).   17 
 
and nothing in bankruptcy law takes that leverage away.   The UAW was able to 
negotiate directly with New Chrysler in the same way that any company can negotiate, 
without any restraints imposed by bankruptcy laws.  
Moreover, proponents observe that the UAW made significant concessions to 
New Chrysler, including making substantial changes to its contracts in order to improve 
the profitability of New Chrysler.  The secured creditors made no similar concessions.  
According to proponents, although the disgruntled secured creditors of Old Chrysler were 
disappointed with what they received in the bankruptcy, and felt that the UAW walked 
away with generous terms from New Chrysler, that outcome was the product of 
negotiations which are not within the scope of the bankruptcy laws. 
In addition, supporters believe that it is not alarming, or even unusual, that the 
U.S. Treasury pushed for favorable treatment of certain stakeholders, the UAW retirees.  
The Treasury was the DIP lender, with the power and influence that role confers in any 
bankruptcy.  As Chrysler’s condition deteriorated, the government provided both pre- and 
post-petition financing.  On account of the government’s pre-petition claim, it had the 
rights of a pre-petition creditor entitled only to distributions from the bankruptcy estate in 
accordance with priority rules under Chapter 11.  On account of its post-petition claim, 
however, the government had power and leverage as a DIP financer.
69  Because no post-
petition lender is required to lend to the debtor and because dealing with bankrupt 
businesses is often regarded as quite risky, the leverage of the DIP lender is extremely 
high.  As a result, DIP lenders routinely use the terms of the new loan to assume control 
and shape the outcome of the reorganization (for example, by deciding which contracts 
with suppliers, dealers, labor, etc. it wishes the debtor to assume).
70  At the time Chrysler 
filed bankruptcy, the capital markets were experiencing a credit freeze and the amount of 
money needed to reorganize the company was very large.  This allowed any DIP financer 
that stepped forward even more leverage than it may have had under ordinary 
circumstances, according to supporters.
71   
                                                 
69 To obtain financing to operate in Chapter 11, debtors arrange for debtor-in-possession (or DIP) 
financing.  Such financing is often provided by creditors who have existing loans with the debtor and hence 
act largely to limit their losses. 
70 See
 Lubben (2009) at 535; and  Miller and Waisman  (2004). 
71 This argument also addresses claims of federal government bullying.  See supra note 1. 18 
 
Because the Treasury played an important role in financing and negotiating the 
restructuring of Chrysler, proponents argue that it is not surprising that the Treasury 
exercised its bargaining power as a DIP lender to dictate that the UAW Trust receive 
special treatment.  From this perspective, the Treasury was nothing more than a normal 
DIP lender.  Although the involvement of the U.S. government in the reorganization may 
have been novel, proponents argue that the Treasury’s exercise of the DIP lender’s power 
in connection with the asset sale was not.
72  One “can debate whether it is wise for the 
government to bail out the UAW, but it does not implicate the bankruptcy process.”
73   
It may also be argued that priority violations are common in bankruptcy and are 
already factored into bond prices.  Research shows that priority violations in favor of 
junior investors over senior investors have been common.
74  Professors Baird and 
Bernstein explain, moreover, that these observed deviations from absolute priority do not 
necessarily flow from manipulation of Chapter 11 (Baird and Bernstein 2006).  Rather, 
they more likely represent rational, voluntary settlements that reflect the uncertainty 
involved in valuing complex business enterprises in distress.   Since Chapter 11 entitles 
junior investors to insist on an appraisal of the debtor, the outcome of which is uncertain, 
senior investors may willingly agree to distributions in favor of junior investors as an 
insurance policy against that uncertainty.  That is, valuation uncertainty produces a 
bargaining dynamic that accounts for observed deviations from absolute priority, not a 
defect in Chapter 11 that allows junior investors to manipulate the process.  Viewed in 
this light, the Chrysler reorganization does not represent a lack of commitment to the 
principle of absolute priority.   
Moreover, some proponents argue that the Chrysler reorganization is a one-off 
transaction with no precedential value, due to the unusual circumstances surrounding it.  
The reorganization required heavy government involvement.  Without the government 
flooding the businesses with cash, proponents believe the creditors might not have agreed 
to the terms of the reorganization.  That is, any priority violation was accompanied by a 
large cash infusion from the government to help the company stay afloat.  The downside 
to creditors of a priority violation was offset by the benefits of keeping the debtor in  
                                                 
72 Lubben (2009) at 546. 
73 Id. 
74 See text accompanying infra note 78. 19 
 
operation.  Without that aspect, more creditors might have objected to the proposed 
terms, producing a more traditional and time-intensive reorganization process that may 
have ended in liquidation and a smaller net recovery by claimants. 
  Hence, from this perspective, the Chrysler restructuring does not disrupt existing 
bankruptcy laws or current bankruptcy practices.  The government played fairly by the 
established rules.  According to adherents of this view, the critics are bothered by the fact 
that the government was a major participant in the transaction, and that it chose to favor 
the union over investors.  While critics may object to that decision, supporters say it is a 
policy question, not a legal one.  If bond market participants view the Chrysler bailout in 
this manner, bond prices (and yields) of unionized companies should not exhibit any 
significant change around the bailout. 
 
H3:  The federal government’s intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy 
added moral hazard to the financial markets by issuing an implicit 
guarantee of the obligations of similar companies.   
 
The third hypothesis is that, as a result of the government’s intervention in the 
Chrysler bankruptcy, lenders now expect future public interventions with respect to 
companies with similar characteristics, allowing them to avert bankruptcy.  After the 
Lehman bankruptcy in September of 2008, there was tremendous uncertainty about 
potential federal government involvement in providing liquidity and short-term funding 
to large industrial firms.  This uncertainty subsided with the federal government agreeing 
to provide support to the auto companies in December, 2008, essentially signaling to the 
markets that they would not allow large industrial firms subject to collective bargaining 
to fail.  According to this view, the credit markets interpreted the auto bailout as meaning 
that the class of large industrial firms subject to collective bargaining is now “too big to 
fail.”  The possibility of a government infusion of funds into “too-big-to-fail” companies 
could make those companies more attractive for bond investors by lowering their risk of 
nonpayment.  If they interpret the Chrysler bailout in this manner, bond investors should 
reevaluate their risk assessments of large unionized companies with significant political 
importance, and demand a lower return on their capital to compensate for the lower 
perceived risk of such companies.  Consequently, bond prices of unionized companies 20 
 
should have significantly increased following the Chrysler bailout.  Or, equivalently, 
bond yields of unionized companies should have significantly decreased. 
We test these hypotheses empirically in this paper. 
 
IV. Related  Literature 
 
When it established the TARP, Congress created an oversight panel (the 
“Oversight Panel”) to oversee Treasury’s administration of the TARP.  The Oversight 
Panel was mandated to review “the impact of Treasury decisions on the financial 
markets” and, regarding the decision to bail out Chrysler, to “determine whether 
predictions that the Chrysler decision would result in changes in market behavior or the 
cost of capital were (1) accurate and (2) measurable.”
75  However, after consulting with 
academics and market participants, the Oversight Panel concluded that “there is little 
evidence, empirical or anecdotal, to prove or disprove the claim that the Chrysler 
bankruptcy had any effect on the market.”
76   
  Few academic studies are on point, and the existing papers do not shed much light 
on the issues.  There has been some empirical research on priority violations in 
bankruptcy (Franks and Torous 1989, 1994; Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt 1990; Weiss 
1990
77, Betker 1995, and Bharath et al. 2007).  Studies find that priority violations in 
favor of equity holders were common in the 1980s, but since the mid-1990s equity-
favoring violations have disappeared as a result of greater creditor control of bankruptcy.  
However, those studies focus on the subordination of creditors to equity holders, not the 
subordination of one (senior) creditor class to another (junior) creditor class, as this paper 
does.   
  Unlike those studies, which treat creditors as a single, unified class, this study 
examines conflict between senior and junior classes of creditors.  That is, we focus on the 
purported subordination of secured creditors to unsecured, but politically-favored, 
creditors.  This is an important line of inquiry.  A secured creditor, which lends to a 
                                                 
75 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 53. 
76 One of the academics consulted by the Oversight Panel stated, “I am unaware of empirical support for 
the claim that the Chrysler and General Motors cases will increase the cost of capital to corporate debtors.”  
Yet, the same academic believed that, given these cases, “one might expect future firms to face a higher 
cost of capital.” Adler (2009) at 6. 
77 Weiss looks at the claims of secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders in bankruptcy 
from 1979 to 1986, but finds no violations of the secured creditors’ priority.   21 
 
debtor against collateral, expects to have a lower risk of non-payment than were it an 
unsecured creditor, and prices the loan accordingly.  As a result, violations of established 
creditor priorities might have substantial ramifications for the availability and cost of 
credit.   
  Recently, the law scholarship has turned its attention away from the conflict 
between creditors and equity holders, focusing instead on the conflict between senior and 
junior creditors.  This interest in creditor conflict coincides with the development of the 
claim trading market for distressed securities.  The law scholarship observes that claims 
trading has resulted in a traditional, fairly homogenous set of creditors being replaced by 
a more fluid set of stakeholders, including distressed debt investors with varying 
motivations and objectives (Baird and Rasmussen 2010, 2003; Ayotte and Morrison 
2009; Baird 2009; Levitin 2009; Baird and Bernstein 2006; Miller and Waisman 2004).  
Law scholars debate whether the claims trading market is beneficial or harmful for the 
bankruptcy reorganization process and the cost of capital for business.  But the literature 
is mostly theoretical and, as a result, “scholarly treatments have operated with a high 
level of generality and scant evidentiary basis.”
78  Law scholars have seized upon the 
Chrysler reorganization to continue this debate.  While some argue that the Chrysler case 
“cannot be understood as complying with good bankruptcy practice…” and that it has 
“potential for disrupting financial markets surrounding troubled companies…” (Roe and 
Skeel 2010; see also Adler 2009), others see it as “entirely within the mainstream of 
chapter 11 practice” (Lubben 2009).
79  But again, the debate has proceeded with little 
empirical evidence.  For instance, while Adler (2009) cautions that “one might expect 
future firms to face a higher cost of capital” as a result of Chrysler, he also states, “I am 
unaware of empirical support for the claim….”  Hence, we contribute to this literature by 
providing needed empirical evidence. 
  Our paper also contributes to the literature tracing the effects of government 
bailouts on the firm (e.g., Jiang, Kim and Zhang 2010; and Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell 2006).  Existing studies examine the impact of government bailouts on firm 
                                                 
78 Levitin (2009) at 67. 
79 See Warburton (2010) for a summary of arguments on each side of the debate. 22 
 
performance.  But we examine a different effect.  Our study looks at the impact of 
bailouts on borrowing costs in the credit markets. 
  Our paper is also related to the empirical literature on moral hazard in financial 
institutions.  While most of that literature examines how the too-big-to-fail status of a 
bank benefits its stockholders (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2010; Fratianni and 
Marchionne 2010; Angbazo and Saunders 1997; Black et al. 1997; and O’Hara and Shaw 
1990), there have been a few studies that examine the effects on bondholders (Morgan 
and Stiroh 2005; Penas and Unal 2004; and Flannery and Sorescu 1996).  Our study 
furthers that literature on moral hazard in credit markets.   
  Academic research has looked at the role of organized labor within the firm, 
though it has not explored whether government bailouts of unionized firms impact credit 
markets.  Previous research has shown that unionization has an impact on firm 
operations.  For example, labor unions increase worker salaries
80, reduce firm operating 
flexibility
81, reduce firm profitability and equity values
82, and impact corporate 
investment decisions.
83  Chen et al. (2010b) finds that firms in more unionized industries 
have lower bond yields than firms in lesser unionized industries.  The authors of that 
study believe bondholders view unions favorably because they place a check on 
management, mitigating agency within the firm.  But Chen et al. does not examine the 
role of public support for unionized companies, which is the focus of our paper.   
Moreover, Chen et al. studies the period 1984-98.  In contrast, our paper focuses on the 
recent financial crisis and the government’s response.  As such, we are able to examine 
whether government bailouts of unionized firms have an impact on bond prices.   
 
V.   Data & Methodologies 
 
In this section, we briefly describe the data sources used in this study.  Firm-level 
accounting and price information are obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  Bond 
trade prices are obtained from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) 
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Lewis (1986). 
81 See, e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2010a). 
82 See, e.g., Hirsch (1991) and Abowd (1989). 
83 See, e.g., Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986). 23 
 
system dataset for the time period January 2008 to December 2009.
84  We follow 
Bessembinder et al. (2009) by eliminating cancelled, corrected, and commission trades 
from the data.  We merge the remaining bond trades with the Fixed Income Security 
Database (FISD), which contains information regarding each bond’s rating, time to 
maturity, coupon payments, and other characteristics.  Our sample includes all U.S. 
corporate bonds listed in FISD that satisfy a set of selection criteria commonly used in 
the corporate bond literature.
85  We remove all bonds with equity or derivative features 
(i.e., callable, puttable, and convertible bonds), bonds with warrants, bonds with floating 
interest rates, and bonds with any credit enhancements.  We also eliminate all bonds that 
have less than one year to maturity or have been issued less than a year ago, and require 
all bonds to have an assigned rating and SIC code.  As we are interested in industrial 
firms, we remove all financial firms from the sample (SIC codes 6000-6999).   So as to 
not bias our analyses, we also remove from the sample Ford, General Motors and 
Chrysler.  To be able compute daily bond returns, we also require bonds to have traded 
on two consecutive days over the sample period.  Our final sample consists of 508 bonds 
from 269 firms. ￿














where Pt is the clean price of the bond, AIt  is the accrued interest over one period, and Ct 
is the coupon payment whenever it is paid (in which case AIt = 0).  To remove potential 
data entry errors, we follow Bessembinder et al. (2006) by requiring that the absolute 
value of the return be less than 30%.  As there are multiple bonds for each firm, 
company-level returns are computed by value-weighting individual bond returns using 
their market values.   
  To identify firms subject to collective bargaining, we go through 10-K reports 
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission by the 269 firms in our 
                                                 
84  TRACE reports prices for roughly 95% of all corporate bond transactions.  The only transaction that are 
not reported are those that take place in exchanges. 




86  We categorize companies as unionized or non-unionized.  We define a 
unionized company as one where 30% or more of its workforce is unionized or covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement.
87  We are unable find unionization rates for all the 
firms in our sample.  Of the 269 firms in our sample, we are able to find unionization 
rates for 163 firms.  Of the 163 firms, we classify 69 as unionized. 
Conceivably, there could be significant differences between unionized and non-
unionized companies that might impact our results.  Hence, we want to be sure that our 
results do not reflect differences between the two sets of firms, particularly regarding 
differences in credit risk.  We compute summary statistics for various default measures 
and financial characteristics of unionized and non-unionized companies.  These are the 
same measures used in Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) and discussed in detail in that 
paper.  These results are summarized in Table 1.  Aggregate volatility, totvol, is measured 
using daily returns over the previous 12 months.  o-score is the Ohlson (1985) default 
score.
88  Idiosyncratic volatility, idiovol, is calculated relative to the Fama-French 3-
factor model.
89  bm is the book-to-market ratio.  lme is the log of market capitalization.   
nimtavg measures profitability and is calculated as a geometrically declining average of 
past values of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets.  Leverage is 
measured by tlmta, which is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets.  
                                                 
86 As a robustness check, we also examined industry-level unionization rates, which are obtained from the 
Union Membership and Coverage Database (Unionstats).   This database provides annual industry 
estimates at the 4-digit level.  Results, however, do not substantially differ from the reported results 
employing firm-level unionization rates.  Moreover, there is a 58% correlation between firm- and industry-
level unionization rates. 
87 As a robustness check, we also employed alternative methodologies: (i) we used different percentages 
(20% and 50%) to define a unionized company; and (ii) we sorted companies into, alternatively, three 
buckets and five buckets, based upon unionization rates.  Results, however, do not substantially differ from 
the reported results employing the 30% unionization definition. 
88 O-score is defined as:  
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where SIZE is total assets divided by the consumer price index, TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets, CLCA is the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, OENEG is a dummy variable set equal to 
one if total liabilities exceeds total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets, 
FUTL is the ratio of funds from operations to total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if 
net income was negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, and CHIN is change in net income over 
the last quarter: (NIt-NIt−1)/(|NIt| + |NIt−1|). 
89 We regress daily stock returns from the previous calendar year on the Fama-French 3 
factors:r= 
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chs-pd is the default probability, calculated as in Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi 
(2008).
90  Merton-DD is the Merton (1974) distance-to-default measure.  The computation 
of merton-DD is described in detail in Anginer and Yildizhan (2010).  Rating is the S&P 
500 rating, where the rating has been converted to numeric values (AAA = 1, …, C = 13).  
Finally, maturity is the average maturity of the bonds for a firm and is measured in years.   
Table 1 reports that, along most of the financial characteristics described above, 
unionized and non-unionized companies are similar.  The results indicate that, relative to 
the non-unionized companies, the unionized companies are less profitable, have bonds 
with slightly longer maturities, and have slightly lower-ranked ratings.  Unionized 
companies are also larger and have more liabilities relative to assets.  But with respect to 
other financial ratios and credit risk measures, we do not see statistically significant 
differences.  That is, unionized and non-unionized companies are the same in terms of 
aggregate volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, default probability, distance to default, and 
default score.  These results suggest that the two set of companies have similar credit-
riskiness characteristics. 
 
VI.   Results  
  
  In this section, we examine yields and returns on corporate bonds over the 2008 
and 2009 period.  We then conduct an event study of abnormal bond returns on key event 
dates relating to the Chrysler bailout.    
  Figure 2 shows the yields on bonds of unionized companies and non-unionized 
companies.  Results are shown separately for high-yield and investment-grade bonds.  
For investment grade bonds, the yield on bonds of unionized companies tracks the yield 
on bonds of non-unionized companies for most of 2008.  Around September, 2008, 
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where NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the 
market value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, 
EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 
500 index, SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is 
the log of the ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the 
ratio of cash to the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio,  and PRICE is the log of 
the price per share truncated from above at $15. 26 
 
however, the yield of “non-unionized” bonds spikes, while the yield of “unionized” 
bonds remains flat.  In other words, the price of the non-unionized bonds in the secondary 
market dropped in late 2008, with the worsening of the financial crisis, while the prices 
of the unionized bonds held steady.  The stability of the unionized bond prices is 
consistent with investors’ expectations of public support for unionized companies.   
Investors perceived unionized bonds to be less risky than the non-unionized bonds during 
the crisis.   
  More interesting than investment-grade bonds, however, are high-yield bonds.   
Since the high yield bonds pose a greater risk of non-payment, their yields should be 
more sensitive to government policies.  Figure 2 shows that the high-yield bonds follow a 
trend similar to, but more pronounced than, that of the investment-grade bonds.   
  With respect to the high-yield bonds, the yield for unionized companies tracks the 
yield for non-unionized companies during 2008.  Yields on both unionized and non-
unionized bonds spike in the latter part of 2008, with the worsening of the financial crisis.  
In early 2009, however, the yield on non-unionized bonds shoots above that of unionized 
bonds.  And this spread between yields persists through the remainder of 2009.   
  Again, the relatively lower yield on the unionized bonds (i.e., their relatively 
higher price in the secondary market) reflects investor’s expectations of public support 
for the unionized firms.  As with investment-grade bonds, investors in high-yield bonds 
perceive the unionized bonds to be less risky than the non-unionized bonds during the 
crisis.   
  These results are generally consistent with earlier studies finding that firms in 
more unionized industries have lower bond yields (e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-
Molina 2010b).  By focusing on the 2008-09 period, our study demonstrates that the 
findings of earlier studies continue to hold during a financial shock and economic 
recession, and that the trends are exaggerated by the adoption of a public bailout policy.  
  Figure 3 shows cumulative raw returns on bonds of unionized firms versus non-
unionized firms over the 2008-09 period.  The bonds of unionized firms generate greater 
cumulative returns than the bonds of non-unionized firms.  The difference in cumulative 
returns over the period amounts to nearly 20%.  Moreover, this differential is generated 
during the sub-period from the onset of the financial crisis in September, 2008 to the 27 
 
completion of the Chrysler bailout in mid-2009.  There is no perceptible differential in 
returns in first half of 2008, and the differential does not change in the second half of 
2009. 
  We also examine cumulative returns on a risk-adjusted basis.  Following 
Bessembinder et al. (2009) we group all bonds into four S&P rating categories, and 
compute value-weighted returns for all bonds falling into each of the rating groups.
91  We 
do not further partition by size or time-to-maturity due to the fact that a number of bonds 
do not trade on a daily basis; thus finer partitions result in small sample sizes within each 
partition.  Cumulative risk-adjusted returns are shown in Figure 4.  Cumulative risk-
adjusted returns for both unionized and non-unionized firms drop with the worsening of 
the financial crisis in late 2008.  But the cumulative returns of unionized firms recover 
more quickly.  The spread in the returns widens during the spring of 2009, with the 
fashioning of the auto bailout.  As with the raw returns, the difference in cumulative risk-
adjusted returns amounts to about 30% over the period studied.   
  Over the period we study, there is no evidence that investors were worried about 
political interference in unionized firms as a consequence of the bailouts.  To the 
contrary, investors reacted positively to the prospect of public support.  
We also undertake an event study of bond returns in order to pinpoint when and 
how the bailout impacted the credit market.   Key event dates relating to the bailout are 
set forth in the Appendix hereto.  To compute abnormal returns, we use the five-factor 
bond model developed in Fama and French (1993).  This model is an extension of the 
commonly used three-factor stock return model, which includes factors for the market 
risk premium (or MKT), firm size (small minus big, or SMB), and value (high minus 
low, or HML).  The bond model adds two additional factors: TERM, which represents 
the slope of the Treasury yield curve, and DEF, the default premium measured as the 
difference between the returns on long-term corporate bond indices and long-term 
Treasuries.  Formally, the model developed by Fama and French to estimate expected 
bond returns is: 
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To the model, we add a dummy variable, DATE_DUMMY, that takes on a value of one 
during a three-day window around the event dates (t-1, t, t+1) which we study in this 
paper.
92  The results from these regressions are reported in Table 2 for unionized 
companies (Panel A), non-unionized companies (Panel B), and the difference between 
unionized and non-unionized companies (Panel C).  The coefficient on the dummy 
variable represents the abnormal return on the bonds during the event window.  It 
captures the impact of the event on bond returns.     
 
(a) The Bush Administration Approves Use of TARP Funds for Chrysler and GM 
 
  December 12, 2008.  The Bush administration suggested, on December 12, 2008, 
that Chrysler and General Motors might be eligible for TARP funds.  This announcement 
reversed Treasury Secretary Paulson’s position that TARP funds would be used to help 
only financial institutions.  The administration’s announcement was prompted by the 
Senate’s rejection of a legislative bailout package for the auto companies on December 
11.  That legislation failed in the Senate because Republicans were demanding deep 
concessions from the labor union as part of any bailout.  The legislative failure prompted 
the Bush administration, on the morning of December 12, to declare that it would be 
“irresponsible” to let the auto companies fail, and that it would consider using the TARP 
funds. 
The bonds of unionized companies did not respond to this reversal of position by 
the Bush administration.  The coefficient on the date dummy is insignificant for 
unionized companies (Panel A), indicating that the announcement did not have a 
significant impact on bond returns of unionized companies.  The announcement did not 
have a significant impact on bond returns of non-unionized companies (Panel B) either.  
It may be that the possibility of a bailout was still too uncertain.  That uncertainty, 
however, was resolved on December 19. 
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  December 19, 2008.  The Bush administration announced, on December 19, 2008, 
that it would lend Chrysler and GM a combined total of $17.4 billion from TARP funds.     
The bonds of unionized companies responded positively to the announcement.  
Those bonds generated significant positive abnormal returns upon the bailout 
announcement.  The announcement added approximately 0.77% to the daily returns on 
bonds of unionized companies.  The bonds of non-unionized companies, in contrast, 
exhibited no response.  The difference in the abnormal returns of the two types of 
companies was a statistically significant one, amounting to 1.27% on a daily basis.   
The significant positive impact of the announcement on unionized bond returns is 
surprising given the announcement’s tough treatment of Chrysler’s bondholders.  The 
TARP loans required that the auto company meet certain targets, including replacing 
two-thirds of its debt with stock (as well as using stock instead of cash to fund retiree 
health care obligations, and establishing wage structures and workplace rules that are 
more competitive with foreign rivals), though the targets were non-binding.  Moreover, 
the TARP loans would become due if, by March 31, the company failed to extract 
sufficient concessions from creditors, workers, suppliers, dealers, and other stakeholders 
to establish long-term viability.  And, oversight would fall to the incoming Obama 
administration, which was strongly backed by the UAW.
93  In fact, both the UAW and 
certain members of Congress signaled, on this date, that they would wait for the Obama 
administration to enter before making concessions in negotiations.  
The significant positive impact on unionized bond returns is also surprising given 
that the loans drained what remained of the first half of the $700 TARP funds.  To make 
additional loans to Chrysler or other companies from the TARP funds, the administration 
would have to approach Congress.  However, on this date, Secretary Paulson stated that 
Congress should release the second $350 billion of TARP funds.  But Paulson did not 
formally make that request to Congress, stating that the formal request would happen “in 
the near future” after consulting with the incoming Obama administration. 
 
(b) Congress Fails to Block Second Half of TARP Funds 
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Under the TARP legislation passed in October, 2008, Congress was authorized to 
block the release of the second half of the $700 billion of TARP funds.  Congress could 
block the release only if both the House and Senate voted to do so (though the President 
could veto any legislation).  A resolution of disapproval was submitted to both the House 
and Senate for a vote, passage of which would block Treasury’s access to the remaining 
TARP funds.  Some members of Congress wanted to scrap TARP, some wanted to 
impose new conditions on any additional funds, and some wanted to dedicate funds to 
preventing foreclosures.  Hence, Treasury’s access to the second half of TARP funds for 
the auto bailout was not a certainty.   
  January 15, 2009.  On this date, the Senate voted 52-42 to defeat a resolution 
blocking the release of the additional TARP funds.  Since both chambers had to pass such 
a resolution to block the release of the funds, a House vote was consequently rendered 
moot and access to the remaining funds was assured.  However, bond returns did not 
exhibit a significant response to the vote.  
  While we use January 15, 2009, the date the Senate approved access to the TARP 
funds, as the event date, events on the prior day were also important.  On January 14, 
2009, Obama officials gave Senate Republicans assurances they were seeking that the 
additional TARP funds would be used only for the auto, banking, and housing industries 
and not for a broader industrial policy.  Such assurances made Congressional support for 
the auto bailout more likely.  Thus, January 14 was an important date.  And our event 
window around January 15 encompasses it.  Bond returns, however, were not impacted 
by the events on January 14 and 15.   
 
(c) The Treasury Issues Results of its Viability Review 
 
In February, 2009, Chrysler submitted to the Treasury its plan to achieve long-
term viability.  Submission of an acceptable viability plan was a requirement attached to 
the TARP loans the auto companies received in December. 
  March 29, 2009.  After reviewing the viability plan submitted by Chrysler, the 
Treasury announced a summary of its findings on March 29, 2009.  The Treasury made 
the following findings: 31 
 
• Chrysler is not viable as a stand-along company and must merge with 
Fiat. 
• The best chance for success would “require utilizing the bankruptcy code 
in a quick and surgical way.”   
• The company will have additional time (30 days) to produce a new, more 
aggressive  viability plan, in order to pursue an alliance with Fiat (or 
another company) and to gain bigger concessions from stakeholders, 
particularly creditors and the UAW.  If an acceptable plan is not 
submitted by then, government support will end and bankruptcy will be 
the likely course. 
The findings indicated that Treasury intended to intervene more deeply than expected 
into the affairs of the auto company. 
  Bond returns, however, did not respond in a significant manner.  Treasury’s 
announcement had an insignificant impact on bonds of unionized and non-unionized 
companies. 
  March 30, 2009.  Following up on the summary announced the day before, 
President Obama and the Treasury released more details, including term sheets.   
Treasury indicated that Chrysler’s survival “at a minimum would require 
extinguishing the vast majority of Chrysler’s outstanding secured debt and all of its 
unsecured debt and equity.”  The Treasury, however, did not explicitly mention any cuts 
for retirees or reductions in Chrysler’s legacy costs.  According to the media, the 
announcement surprised some secured creditors, who believed they would fare better 
without government intervention.  One of the creditors stated, “If you are a secured 
lender, you expect to come out on top.  I hope the government isn’t saying it has the right 
to reshuffle the decks.”
94   
Nevertheless, bond returns did not react.  Abnormal returns on bonds of unionized 
and non-unionized companies were not significantly different from zero.   
 
(d)  Litigation  
 
During the Chrysler bankruptcy proceedings, certain secured first-priority debt 
holders, three Indiana state pension funds, objected to the proposed reorganization.  The 
funds argued that the scheme would violate the Bankruptcy Code by impermissibly 
subordinating their interests as secured lenders.  They claimed that the sale would violate 
                                                 
94 Kate Linebaugh, Detroit’s New Model: Chrysler Plan Trims Fiat’s Stake, WALL ST. J., March 31, 2009. 32 
 
bankruptcy priority rules by paying unsecured creditors while secured creditors were 
receiving only 29 cents on the dollar. The funds also argued that the first-lien debt 
holders could recover more in liquidation, and that Chrysler could sell the assets for more 
than the $2 billion New Chrysler had offered. The bankruptcy court denied the funds’ 
motion
95 and approved the reorganization. The funds immediately appealed.  The Second 
Circuit issued an order ratifying the bankruptcy court’s decision, and issued a stay to 
allow for review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Although the Supreme Court initially 
granted a temporary stay, it vacated the stay on the next day.
96  Upon remand, the Second 
Circuit affirmed
97 the bankruptcy court’s decision.
98  The relevant dates are April 30, 
June 1, June 2, June 5, June 8, June 9, June 10, July 5, and August 5, as set forth in the 
Appendix. 
  None of these event dates, however, produces a significant impact on bond 
returns.  The structure of the Chrysler reorganization was challenged but upheld in the 
bankruptcy court, the Second Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court.  Yet, none of those 





  We find that bondholders responded positively to the government’s decision to 
assist Chrysler.  That is, bondholders approved of the bailout decision.   
  But in contrast to their positive reaction to the initial bailout decision, 
bondholders exhibited no reaction to the specific terms of the bailout that emerged over 
the subsequent months and that purportedly favored the union over secured creditors.  
Bondholders also shrugged of the court decisions that put a judicial stamp of approval on 
the arrangement.  The results reject the argument of the bailout’s critics, that the bailout 
would be perceived by bondholders as establishing a precedent for future subordination 
of creditors in bankruptcy. 
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  Instead, the results support the notion that government bailouts generate moral 
hazard in the financial markets.  The results show that the Chrysler bailout led investors 
to expect additional bailouts of troubled companies in the future.  After the government 
allowed Lehman Brothers to fail in September of 2008, there was reason for credit 
markets to doubt whether the government would support troubled firms.  With Chrysler, 
the government signaled its willingness to stand behind large, struggling companies, 
especially those with high unionization rates.  As a result of this signal that large, 
unionized companies have become too-big-to-fail, investors believed that the debt of 
these companies had become less risky.   
  The perception that certain large troubled companies have become public bailouts 
candidates has economy-wide ramifications.  It enables such troubled companies to 
borrow more cheaply than they could in the absence of an implicit government guarantee.  
Hence, capital flows to firms that should otherwise fail.  In this respect, the Chrysler 
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   UNION     NON‐UNION     UNION ‐ NON‐UNION 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Median  25th Pctl  75th Pctl     Mean  Std Dev  Median  25th Pctl  75th Pctl     Mean  t‐stat 
idiovol  0.024  0.018  0.017  0.016  0.027     0.025  0.010  0.023  0.018  0.027     0.000  0.11 
bm  1.458  1.109  1.244  0.891  1.417     1.400  1.037  1.125  0.536  1.851     0.058  ‐0.33 
lme  9.489  1.674  9.263  8.036  11.475     9.025  1.519  8.799  8.115  10.425     0.463  ‐1.79* 
merton‐DD  8.504  3.176  9.018  6.214  10.832     9.243  4.886  7.967  6.315  10.844     ‐0.739  1.06 
chs‐pd  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.001     0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.002     0.000  1.39 
nimtavg  0.009  0.005  0.008  0.006  0.009     0.014  0.008  0.012  0.009  0.019     ‐0.005  ‐4.34*** 
o‐score  ‐2.407  0.664  ‐2.581  ‐2.848  ‐1.865     ‐2.517  0.868  ‐2.407  ‐3.326  ‐1.868     0.109  ‐0.84 
tlmta  0.614  0.151  0.585  0.479  0.742     0.558  0.219  0.534  0.393  0.761     0.056  ‐1.74* 
totvol  0.036  0.019  0.029  0.027  0.037     0.039  0.014  0.037  0.032  0.044     ‐0.003  1.15 
maturity  11.073  7.238  9.855  4.857  16.230     8.932  5.868  7.205  3.344  13.795     2.141  1.91** 
rating  9.570  4.075  9.000  6.000  13.000     8.684  3.030  9.000  7.000  10.000     0.886  ‐1.65 
                                  
UNCLASSIFIED                    
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Median  25th Pctl  75th Pctl                        
idiovol  0.025  0.013  0.021  0.017 0.029                   
mb  1.559  1.054  1.386  0.790 2.266                   
lme  9.191  1.435  9.242  8.384 9.968                   
merton‐DD  10.188  5.916  8.522  6.757 13.115                   
chs‐pd  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.000 0.001                   
nimtavg  0.011  0.008  0.012  0.007 0.016                   
o‐score  ‐3.001  2.474  ‐2.605  ‐3.206 ‐2.321                   
tlmta  0.510  0.219  0.492  0.323 0.673                   
totvol  0.038  0.014  0.033  0.027 0.045                   
maturity  12.878  9.953  12.389  6.938 17.037                   
rating  9.076  3.751  9.000  7.000 11.000                   




Table 2: Event Study – Panel A 
This table provides the results from the event regressions:  =  _
ii i i i i i i i
t t MKT t SMB t HML t DEF t TERM t DUMMY t t r rf MKT SMB HML DEF TERM DATE DUMMY ab b b b b b e -+ + + + + + + . Value –
weighted excess bond returns ( i
tt rr f - ) of portfolio of unionized (Panel A) and non-unionized companies (Panel B), as well as a portfolio formed by going long unionized and short non-unionized 
companies (Panel C), are regressed on risk factors and a dummy variable (DATE_DUMMY) that takes on a value of one in the three days (t-1,t,t+1) around the specified event date.  MKT is the market 
risk premium, SMB is the size factor, HML is the value factor, computed as in Fama and French (1993).  TERM is the return on long-term treasury bonds minus the return on short-term (three month) 
treasuries.  DEF is the return on value-weighted long-term corporate bonds minus the return on long-term treasury bonds. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML DEF TERM 12/12/08  12/19/08  1/15/09  3/29/09 3/30/09 4/30/09 6/1/09  6/2/09 6/5/09 6/8/09 6/9/09 6/10/09 7/5/09 8/5/09 Adj R^2
Coeff 0.0001  0.0362  ‐0.0013 0.0183  0.5516 0.1746  0.0077 0.074 
t‐stat  0.35 1.59  ‐0.03 0.4 5.29*** 3.49*** 1.5                
Coeff 0.0001  0.0369  ‐0.0066 0.0137  0.5451 0.1744  0.0119 0.067 
t‐stat  0.35 1.61  ‐0.13 0.3 5.19*** 3.47***   3.35***               
Coeff 0.0001  0.0358  ‐0.0032 0.0143  0.5582 0.1775  0.0016 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.56  ‐0.06 0.31  5.32*** 3.52***    0.31              
Coeff 0.0001  0.0363  ‐0.0022 0.0133  0.5589 0.1781  0.0011 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.58  ‐0.04 0.29  5.33*** 3.54***     0.18             
Coeff 0.0001  0.0363  ‐0.0022 0.0133  0.5589 0.1781  0.0011 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.58  ‐0.04 0.29  5.33*** 3.54***      0.18            
Coeff 0.0001  0.0361  ‐0.0022 0.0129  0.5625 0.1781  ‐0.0012 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.58  ‐0.04 0.28  5.32*** 3.54***       ‐0.23           
Coeff 0.0001  0.0358  ‐0.0032 0.0133  0.5558 0.1772  0.0009 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.56  ‐0.06 0.29  5.21*** 3.5***         0.18           
Coeff 0.0001  0.0358  ‐0.0046 0.0140  0.5520 0.1775  0.0021 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.56  ‐0.09 0.31  5.19*** 3.52***         0.41         
Coeff 0.0001  0.0362  ‐0.0022 0.0128  0.5587 0.1782  0.0005 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.58  ‐0.04 0.28  5.32*** 3.53***          0.09        
Coeff 0.0001  0.0364  ‐0.0017 0.0132  0.5527 0.1782  0.0052 0.065 
t‐stat  0.35 1.59  ‐0.03 0.29  5.27*** 3.54***           1.02       
Coeff 0.0001  0.0365  ‐0.0006 0.0129  0.5533 0.1784  0.0058 0.065 
t‐stat  0.35 1.59  ‐0.01 0.28  5.28*** 3.55***            1.14      
Coeff 0.0001  0.0361  ‐0.0022 0.0130  0.5581 0.1778  0.0009 0.063 
t‐stat  0.36 1.57  ‐0.04 0.29  5.31*** 3.53***             0.17     
Coeff 0.0001  0.0356  0.0012  0.0157  0.5625 0.1794  0.0114 0.066 
t‐stat  0.36 1.56  0.02 0.35  5.37*** 3.57***              1.29   
Coeff 0.0001  0.0366  ‐0.0015 0.0118  0.5576 0.1782  0.0015  0.063 




















Intercept MKTRF  SMB HML DEF TERM 12/12/08  12/19/08  1/15/09 3/29/09 3/30/09 4/30/09 6/1/09 6/2/09 6/5/09 6/8/09 6/9/09 6/10/09 7/5/09 8/5/09 Adj R^2
Coeff 0.0006  0.0548  ‐0.0570 ‐0.0539 0.5703 0.2534  0.0054 0.125
t‐stat  0.31  2.89*** ‐1.38 ‐1.43 6.58***  6.09***  1.27                
Coeff 0.0006  0.0554  ‐0.0600 ‐0.0533 0.5604 0.2508  0.0000 0.128
t‐stat  0.31  2.93*** ‐1.45 ‐1.42 6.46***  6.03***   
‐0.01               
Coeff 0.0006  0.0536  ‐0.0608 ‐0.0480 0.5661 0.2516  0.0065 0.129
t‐stat  0.3 2.83*** ‐1.47 ‐1.27 6.55***  6.06***    
1.53              
Coeff 0.0005  0.0539  ‐0.0569 ‐0.0557 0.5723 0.2530  ‐0.0053 0.127
t‐stat  0.28  2.84*** ‐1.38 ‐1.48 6.61***  6.09***     
‐1.03             
Coeff 0.0005  0.0539  ‐0.0569 ‐0.0557 0.5723 0.2530  ‐0.0053 0.127
t‐stat  0.28  2.84*** ‐1.38 ‐1.48 6.61***  6.09***      
‐1.03            
Coeff 0.0007  0.0548  ‐0.0571 ‐0.0540 0.5641 0.2531  0.0023  0.125
t‐stat  0.37  2.89*** ‐1.38 ‐1.44 6.46***  6.09***       
0.53           
Coeff 0.0006  0.0548  ‐0.0569 ‐0.0540 0.5705 0.2534  0.0000 0.125
t‐stat  0.33  2.89*** ‐1.37 ‐1.43 6.48***  6.07***        
‐0.01          
Coeff 0.0007  0.0551  ‐0.0543 ‐0.0551 0.5783 0.2539  ‐0.0023 0.125
t‐stat  0.35  2.91*** ‐1.31 ‐1.46 6.59***  6.1***         
‐0.54         
Coeff 0.0004  0.0547  ‐0.0570 ‐0.0538 0.5709 0.2531  ‐0.0005 0.125
t‐stat  0.22  2.89*** ‐1.38 ‐1.43 6.58***  6.08***          
‐0.11        
Coeff 0.0004  0.0548  ‐0.0571 ‐0.0540 0.5715 0.2533  ‐0.0010 0.125
t‐stat  0.23  2.89*** ‐1.38 ‐1.44 6.59***  6.09***           
‐0.23       
Coeff 0.0007  0.0546  ‐0.0578 ‐0.0539 0.5736 0.2531  ‐0.0032 0.126
t‐stat  0.37  2.88*** ‐1.4  ‐1.43 6.62***  6.09***            
‐0.75      
Coeff 0.0007  0.0548  ‐0.0570 ‐0.0540 0.5708 0.2534  ‐0.0004 0.125
t‐stat  0.35  2.89*** ‐1.38 ‐1.44 6.58***  6.09***             
‐0.09     
Coeff 0.0006  0.0546  ‐0.0557 ‐0.0528 0.5715 0.2539  0.0043 0.125
t‐stat  0.33  2.88*** ‐1.35 ‐1.4  6.6*** 6.1***              
0.6   
Coeff 0.0006  0.0560  ‐0.0550 ‐0.0567 0.5659 0.2539  0.0040  0.126










Table 2: Event Study – Panel C 
 
Intercept MKTRF  SMB HML DEF TERM 12/12/08 12/19/08  1/15/09 3/29/09 3/30/09 4/30/09  6/1/09 6/2/09 6/5/09 6/8/09 6/9/09 6/10/09 7/5/09 8/5/09 Adj R^2 
Coeff ‐0.0005 ‐0.0186 0.0556 0.0722  ‐0.0187 ‐0.0788 0.0023 0.0043 
t‐stat  ‐0.7  ‐0.67  0.92 1.31  ‐0.15 ‐1.3 0.37               
Coeff ‐0.0005 ‐0.0185 0.0534 0.0671  ‐0.0153 ‐0.0765 0.0127 ‐0.004 
t‐stat  ‐0.57 ‐0.66  0.88 1.22  ‐0.12 ‐1.25  
2.94***              
Coeff ‐0.0005 ‐0.0178 0.0577 0.0624  ‐0.0078 ‐0.0741 ‐0.0049 ‐0.0026
t‐stat  ‐0.48 ‐0.64  0.95 1.13  ‐0.06 ‐1.21   
‐0.79             
Coeff ‐0.0004 ‐0.0176 0.0546 0.0690  ‐0.0134 ‐0.0749 0.0064 ‐0.0023
t‐stat  ‐0.6  ‐0.63  0.9 1.25  ‐0.11 ‐1.23    
0.85            
Coeff ‐0.0004 ‐0.0176 0.0546 0.0690  ‐0.0134 ‐0.0749 0.0064 ‐0.0023
t‐stat  ‐0.6  ‐0.63  0.9 1.25  ‐0.11 ‐1.23     
0.85           
Coeff ‐0.0006 ‐0.0186 0.0549 0.0669  ‐0.0016 ‐0.0749 ‐0.0034 ‐0.0033
t‐stat  ‐0.5  ‐0.67  0.91 1.21  ‐0.01 ‐1.23      
‐0.55          
Coeff ‐0.0005 ‐0.0190 0.0537 0.0673  ‐0.0147 ‐0.0762 0.0010 ‐0.0039
t‐stat  ‐0.55 ‐0.68  0.88 1.22  ‐0.11 ‐1.25       
0.16          
Coeff ‐0.0006 ‐0.0192 0.0497 0.0691  ‐0.0263 ‐0.0765 0.0045 ‐0.0028
t‐stat  ‐0.6  ‐0.69  0.82 1.25  ‐0.2  ‐1.25        
0.71        
Coeff ‐0.0003 ‐0.0186 0.0549 0.0666  ‐0.0122 ‐0.0749 0.0009 ‐0.0039
t‐stat  ‐0.55 ‐0.67  0.91 1.21  ‐0.1  ‐1.23         
0.15       
Coeff ‐0.0003 ‐0.0184 0.0554 0.0671  ‐0.0188 ‐0.0751 0.0062 ‐0.0017
t‐stat  ‐0.62 ‐0.66  0.92 1.22  ‐0.15 ‐1.23          
1      
Coeff ‐0.0006 ‐0.0181 0.0572 0.0668  ‐0.0203 ‐0.0748 0.0090 0.0007 
t‐stat  ‐0.66 ‐0.65  0.95 1.21  ‐0.16 ‐1.23           
1.46     
Coeff ‐0.0006 ‐0.0188 0.0548 0.0670  ‐0.0126 ‐0.0757 0.0013 ‐0.0038
t‐stat  ‐0.56 ‐0.68  0.91 1.21  ‐0.1  ‐1.24            
0.2    
Coeff ‐0.0005 ‐0.0190 0.0568 0.0686  ‐0.0091 ‐0.0745 0.0070 ‐0.0030
t‐stat  ‐0.58 ‐0.68  0.94 1.24  ‐0.07 ‐1.22             
0.66   
Coeff ‐0.0005 ‐0.0194 0.0535 0.0685  ‐0.0083 ‐0.0757 ‐0.0025 ‐0.0036






Appendix: Timeline of Events 
 
October 3, 2008  TARP enacted. 
December 11, 2008  Congress rejects auto bailout. 
December 12, 2008  Bush Administration suggests TARP might be used for the auto companies, 
reversing its earlier position. 
December 19, 2008  Bush Administration announces the making of bridge loans to the auto 
companies. 
January 14, 2009  Obama gives Republicans assurances they were seeking as a condition to 
approve second half of TARP funds. 
January 15, 2009  Congress approves release of second half of TARP funds. 
February 17, 2009  Chrysler submits its viability plan. 
March 29, 2009  Treasury announces summary findings of its review of Chrysler viability plan. 
March 30, 2009  President Obama and Treasury announce further details of their findings, set 
forth requirements that Chrysler’s viability plan must meet, and give Chrysler 
30 days to submit a revised plan. 
April 30, 2009  Chrysler files for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. 
June 1, 2009  Bankruptcy Court authorizes the sale of Chrysler’s assets to New Chrysler under 
section 363 of the Code.  Separately, GM files for bankruptcy protection under 
Chapter 11.
99   
June 2, 2009  Second Circuit issues a motion for a stay. 
June 5, 2009  Second Circuit affirms the June 1 order of the Bankruptcy Court. 
June 8, 2009  Supreme Court issues stay. 
June 9, 2009  Supreme Court vacates stay. 
June 10, 2009  Chrysler’s assets are sold to New Chrysler under section 363 of the Code.   
July 5, 2009  GM’s assets are sold under section 363 of the Code.
100 
August 5, 2009  Second Circuit issues its opinion explaining its June 5 Chrysler decision. 
 
                                                 
99 Voluntary Petition, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50026).  
100 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).  